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How Could a Terrorist be De-Radicalised? 
 




This article addresses the potential to de-radicalize a terrorist, and if so how could this be 
achieved? The article also outlines the distinction between de-radicalization, counter-
radicalization and disengagement. In order to understand the potential of de-radicalization 
techniques, research examines the factors that might lead to initial radicalization. The 
strategy of some state-based de-radicalization programs, particularly the Saudi Arabian de-
radicalization program are examined and the importance of unique tailoring in these 
programs is identified. The relevance of ideology and life skill training within de-
radicalization programs is also examined. The extensive impact that information 
communication technology has had on radicalization is also addressed and following on, the 
potential for de-radicalization and counter-radicalization through information 
communication platforms is also discussed. The importance of an accurate and 
appropriately delivered counter-narrative message is examined and the value of such a 
counter-narrative is discussed in terms of it possibly planting the seed of question in a 
terrorist, which may eventually support the terrorist questioning of terrorist group ideology. 
Highly relevant to the future de-radicalization of an ‘in organisation’ terrorist is the issue of 
how states might manage the potential return of terrorists who are known to be overseas and 
whether the best solution is or is not to prevent the terrorist from returning to a home-
country, which is examined within. It could be presumed that a terrorist who is returning to 
a home-country may face some term of incarceration, as an extension of this issue that states 
must address, the effect that incarceration might have on a terrorist is also examined. The 
discussions in this article are relevant to policy-makers, de-radicalization program designers 
and security sector actors.  
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Is it possible to de-radicalise a terrorist? The answer is that de-radicalisation could be 
possible and, further the aim of de-radicalising a terrorist is an ambition that should not be 
abandoned. However, robust data and measurement of the successfulness of de-
radicalisation programs does not exist to an extent that it can support the certain success of 
these programs (Horgan and Altier, 2012).  
To understand how a terrorist may be de-radicalised, we must consider what 
circumstantial factors lead to a given terrorist being radicalised in the first place. From the 
outset, it is apparent that a given terrorist may become the subject of de-radicalisation 
strategies at different phases in their time as a terrorist, as such de-radicalisation 
interventions may be targeted at individuals or groups, and within a terrorist organisation or 
externally. The effective de-radicalisation of a terrorist is summed up by Rabasa, Pettyjohn, 
Ghez and Boucek as follows: 
 
“A true (and successful) de-radicalization program should therefore 
produce a change in an individual’s underlying beliefs, not simply a 
change in behaviour…behaviour can change while objectives remain 
constant.” (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez and Boucek, 2010. p.6). 
 
De-radicalisation strategies differ between terrorists who leave organisations by 
choice compared with those are compelled through capture or societal impost (Kuhl, 2009; 
Husain, 2007a; Husain, 2007b; Stern and Porges, 2010). To understand how a terrorist 
might be de-radicalised, this essay will delve into various points, including broadly how a 
person is initially radicalised. From this discussion, de-radicalisation strategies that are 
utilised by different actors will be examined, including their effectiveness and as far as can 
be quantified; the positive or negative impact associated with each technique. What has 
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or toolkit for de-radicalising terrorists, accordingly de-radicalisation programs must be 
extremely unique and tailored to an individual’s circumstances (Butt and Tuck, n.d; Stern 
and Porges, 2010). Further, the distinction between de-radicalisation and disengagement 
from action should also be clearly articulated as these terms represent two distinct outcomes 
(Horgan and Braddock, 2010; Jones, 2014; Abbasi, n.d). This distinction is that 
disengagement refers to cessation of action only, accordingly a radical can stop active 
participation in a terrorist organisation without necessarily denouncing or even questioning 
radical ideals or idyllic support for a terrorist organisation (Horgan and Braddock, 2010; 
Williams and Lindsey, 2013; Jones, 2014; Abbasi, n.d; Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez and 
Boucek, 2010). As Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez and Boucek (2010) state: 
 
“De-radicalization is the process of changing an individual’s belief system, 
rejecting the extremist ideology, and embracing mainstream values” 
(Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez and Boucek, 2010. p.xiii).  
 
While a truly de-radicalised person will have stopped both physical support for a 
terrorist group as well as having abandoned any common sympathy with the terrorist group 
(Horgan and Braddock, 2010; Jones, 2014; Abbasi, n.d).  
Throughout the literature two distinct terms stand out when referring to 
interventions that address the radicalisation of terrorists: ‘counter-radicalisation’ and ‘de-
radicalisation’. The focus of this essay is constrained to de-radicalisation, however one must 
consider what these two terms represent. As will be discussed further, no one standardised 
model exists for effective de-radicalisation. Techniques that are adaptable and include 
counter-radicalisation or de-radicalisation initiatives must be considered and made available 
in planning individually tailored de-radicalisation programs (Townsend, 2015; Nawaz, 
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States of America Presidential Homeland Security Advisor, defines de-radicalisation and 
counter-radicalisation broadly, with the latter more generalised, preventative and proactive, 
whilst the former involves reactive and targeted techniques for individuals. However, 
Townsend (2015) also uses these two terms interchangeably in practical descriptions of 
methods that state actors might utilise in countering violent extremism. A distinction 
between the two terms could be explained as counter-radicalisation referring to proactive 
initiatives that are targeted towards communities to reduce potential risk of radicalisation, 
such as mass distribution of counter-extremism messages, while the term de-radicalisation is 
reactive and describes interventions that address a specific individual who has been 
radicalised and thus efforts should be to reverse this radicalisation (Townsend, 2011; Stone, 
2011: Horgan and Braddock, 2010). In reviewing the need and effectiveness of counter-
extremist narratives, the Institute of Strategic Dialogue’s report states: 
 
“Alternative narratives play an important role in countering the appeal of 
violent extremism. They do not tend to challenge extremist messaging 
directly, but instead attempt to influence those who might be sympathetic 
towards (but not actively supportive of ) extremist causes, or help to unite 
the silent majority against extremism by emphasising solidarity, common 
causes and shared values” (Briggs and Feve, 2013. p.12).   
 
While there are distinct differences between counter-radicalisation and de-
radicalisation, as will be demonstrated throughout, there is some level of necessary cross-
over between these two broad strategies. Further, research on de-radicalisation techniques 
indicates that successful interventions will be built specifically for the circumstances of 
individual and consist of both counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation (Kappers, 2011; 
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given terrorist becoming radicalised may have relevance to the de-radicalisation of that 
terrorist, as these counter-radicalisation messages may remain with the terrorist after they 
have been radicalised and be supported at a later time by other exit push and pull factors. As 
radicals become radicalised through many different circumstances and identify with varied 
motivational causal factors, or push and pull factors a tailored approach is necessary for de-
radicalisation (Precht, 2007; Kappers, 2011; Jones, 2015b; Stern and Porges, 2010; (Morris, 
Eberhard, Rivera and Watsula, 2010).   
The role of information communication technology is relevant in considering 
radicalisation and de-radicalisation, as remote radicalisation is greatly different to the 
circumstances that radicalise someone through physical interaction (Edwards, Gribbon, 
Reding, and Von Behr, 2013; Vela, 2015). In the following analysis, a number of case 
studies will be identified. It is anticipated that factors contributing to the initial 
radicalisation, including societal circumstances, will be critical in determining the most 
appropriate and successful strategies to de-radicalise terrorists.  
Factors that contribute to the radicalisation of a terrorist may include religious 
discourse, deceptive teachings, societal station or position, political motivation, cultural and 
ethnic identity as well as mental competence (General Intelligence and Security Service – 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2004). Although not exhaustive, these factors and the unique 
individual circumstances of a given terrorist will guide the basis of the most appropriate de-
radicalisation methods. Abbasi (n.d) further notes that disengagement in distancing oneself 
from violent actions does not necessarily require a change in commitment to the motivating 
factor or indicate a change in radicalisation status. De-radicalisation as a process does not 
follow a fixed or simple formula that would be applicable in any circumstance with the 
expectation of success, and as such de-radicalisation programs must be adapted to unique 
individual circumstances to accommodate individuals, small groups or wider communities 
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away from violent action, although they may retain their radical views. Indeed, there may in 
fact be no correlation between de-radicalisation and disengagement (Bjorgo and Horgan, 
n.d). In contrast to Bjorgo and Horgan (n.d), Kruglanski and Gelfand (2015) acknowledge 
that disengagement from violent action does not amount to de-radicalisation, however 
suggest that disengagement may be an accompanying occurrence to de-radicalisation. 
Accordingly, to reach a conclusion with regard to how a person could be de-radicalised, 
strategies that change the subject’s belief system and bring about rejection of the extremist 
ideology, while also promoting normative community values must be pursued (Rabasa, 
Pettyjohn et al., 2010). Rabasa, Pettyjohn et al. (2010) also acknowledge that in the case of 
Islamist motivated extremism, de-radicalisation becomes exceedingly difficult, as the 
motivating ideology is couched in the subject’s commitment to their religion, which can 
understandably be difficult to bring the terrorist to a point where they are able to separate 
their faith from violent extremism and renounce terrorism.  
Rana (2011) identifies the broad approaches that can been applied to de-
radicalisation as being security focused, societal, idyllic and political, as is represented in the 
table below: 
 
Figure 1: Approaches to De-Radicalisation. Swat De-radicalization Model: Prospects for 
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 There is an additional issue that contributes to the difficulty of the successful de-
radicalisation of a terrorist, in that it is challenging to assess whether a terrorist has been 
successfully de-radicalised (Rabasa, Pettyjohn et al., 2010). This raises questions directly 
relevant to how a terrorist might be de-radicalised, as there are noted deficiencies in the 
ability to measure whether a de-radicalisation technique is effective (Rabasa, Pettyjohn et 
al., 2010). This is due to various reasons that broadly fit around the motivation for 
participating in de-radicalisation programs (Rabasa, Pettyjohn et al, 2010). This may 
include misrepresentation of a subject’s post de-radicalisation program beliefs, due to 
motivation of circumstance, such as wanting to appear compliant in response to detention or 
treatment (Rabasa, Pettyjohn et al, 2010). 
 Regarding de-radicalisation techniques, Porges (2011) suggests that de-radicalisation 
models will not be commonly applicable to all terrorists. Expanding this requirement of 
unique intervention, this means that whatever model of de-radicalisation is utilised, it must 
be adaptive and tailored to address the motivations and ideology of a specific terrorist in 
order to have the greatest chance of effectiveness (Porges, 2011). In designing a suitable 
tailored de-radicalisation program, it will be pertinent to identify and understand some 
commonality in what are described as push and pull factors that motivate radicals to self-
disengage or move towards de-radicalisation (Morris, Eberhard, Rivera and Watsula, 2010). 
These push and pull factors are important in the design of a de-radicalisation program, as 
they are deeply relevant as to what might motivate a person to denounce a previously 
strongly held ideology (Morris, Eberhard, Rivera and Watsula, 2010). It is important to 
recognise common push and pull factors, as are identified by Morris, Eberhard, Rivera and 
Watsula (2010), who observe some commonalities in de-radicalisation or disengagement be 
societal restrictions imposed by a group, distain for acts committed by the terrorist group and 
identifying the jarring between doctrine morality of terrorist groups and actions of the 
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influences or desires have also been noted as factors that pull radicals away from terrorist 
groups and towards de-radicalisation (Disley, Weed, Reding, Clutterbuck and Warnes, 
2011). These factors may include building emotional maturity to a point that the terrorist 
essentially grows out of the organisation, experiences or refers back to positive social ties 
such as family support or supportive social networks, changes in tasks that the terrorist must 
undertake within the group and the tangible potential for alternative livelihood generation 
(Disley, Weed, Reding, Clutterbuck and Warnes, 2011). A specific radicalised terrorist may 
not be subject to all of the above influences, however as these factors are identified 
repeatedly as having relevance to a terrorists’ motivation to self-disengage or de-radicalise, 
they must be considered from the outset of de-radicalisation program design, so that 
strategies that address the factors acting upon a given terrorist can be prioritised.  
In discussing how de-radicalisation can be conducted, given an Islamist extremism 
terrorist, Rabasa, Pettyjohn et al, (2010) discuss a religious dual focused approach. That is 
that Islamic religious scholars may be deployed to speak with the terrorist to identify that 
inconsistencies exist between Islamic doctrine and the twisted propaganda of ‘Islamic 
teachings’ of the given terrorist group (Rabasa, Pettyjohn et al, 2010; Nawaz, 2011). 
Sageman (2008) believes that challenging of the validity of religious doctrine propagated by 
terrorist organisations as a de-radicalisation strategy will be largely ineffective. Sageman 
(2008) argues that the broad majority of terrorists do not possess a required level of critical 
understanding of the Quran or Islamic doctrine to be convinced by a rational critique of the 
propaganda teachings. Sageman (2008) clarifies this point in noting that the strategy of 
challenging the religious basis of a terrorist organisation may be effective in contributing to 
the de-radicalisation of a small number of extremist scholars, however the greater terrorist 









ISSN: 2363-9849         
“They would simply have been bored and would not have listened” 
(Sageman, 2008. c.8 p.14). 
 
However, in contrast to Sageman’s (2008) view that there is minimal potential for 
success within de-radicalisation programs that are based upon ideologically challenges, the 
State facilitated de-radicalisation program of Saudi Arabia places significant relevance on 
idilocal challenges being presented to a terrorist (Williams and Lindsey, 2013). While the 
Saudi Arabian de-radicalisation program is not in its targeted at addressing ideology solely, 
ideology is paid extensive significance with these challenges being presented by Islamic 
religious authorities, trusted family of the terrorist or successfully de-radicalised former-
terrorists (Williams and Lindsey, 2013). 
 In considering how a terrorist could be de-radicalised, all avenues must be 
considered. The term counter-narrative is prominent within the de-radicalisation discourse, 
and will be considered here (Nawaz, 2011; Jacobson, 2010; Townsend, 2015). In ‘The 
Terrorist Dropouts’, Jacobson (2010) sets out a number of varying focused strategies that 
may be useful inclusions in a counter-narrative program in order to drive de-radicalisation of 
terrorists. This includes opportunities while a terrorist remains within a terrorist 
organisation, what shall be referred to throughout as ‘in organisation’. Jacobson (2010) 
recommends in the case of the United States Government, that the content of de-
radicalisation programs be extended to enhance public messages to a point that these 
messages discredit and identify hypocrisies that exist within terrorist organisational 
leadership. The value of this approach to de-radicalisation is extensive, as it is not 
unreasonable to see that discrediting, particularly in identifying hypocrisies and 
misrepresentations of Islam would start the questioning of purpose in a given terrorist 
(Green, 2015). Counter-narratives should also publicise the fact that leaving a terrorist 
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Mahbub ‘Ed’ Husain, who both left Hizb-ut-Tarir without violent confrontation (Jacobson, 
2010;  Rabasa, Pettyjohn et al, 2010; Nawaz, 2011; Husain, 2007a; Husain, 2007b). 
Jacobson (2010) also recommends highlighting the realities of life as a terrorist, to enable 
radicals to question the circumstances in which they live. By highlighting the poor 
circumstances of life as a terrorist it is hoped that terrorists might start to question whether it 
is worth it. Jacobson (2010) also identifies that while de-radicalisation counter-narratives are 
often utilised by governments, engaging respected ‘champions’ is important to increase the 
receptiveness of the message. Such champions may include former radicals, as they 
understand both the indoctrination and the experience of successfully extricating 
themselves from a given group (Nawaz, 2011; Husain, 2007). In support of the need for an 
effective counter-narrative, Sageman (2008) highlights the existence of a popular and 
appealing jihad discourse shared among Muslim youth. What can be interpreted from 
Sageman’s (2008) reference to a notion of ‘cool jihad’, is that these youth are receptive to 
influential messages. Therefore to effectively combat radicalisation clear, accurate messages 
shared by well-respected leaders must be utilised and reflects Nawaz’s (2011) intention 
when he refers to a counter narrative. This resembles a standard peer leader system, in 
which an experienced person (i.e. someone who has experienced a terrorist organisation and 
left), will be influential in the de-radicalisation of impressionable parties, particularly 
younger terrorists (Choudhury, 2009). The peer leader system has been applied by the 
Saudi Arabian Government, which established consortiums consisting of academics, judges 
and de-radicalised individuals, to disseminate government driven counter-narratives and 
priorities to radicals (Rubin, 2004). Solomon (2013) believes the government of Saudi 
Arabia has demonstrated an effective deployment of counter-narratives against violent 
Islamic extremism, what Solomon and others refer to as Islamism (Nawaz, 2011). Solomon 
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“This campaign against Islamism was pursued at several levels, including a 
media campaign, engaging in a national dialogue, disrupting the activities 
of those who were promoting violent extremism, a national solidarity 
campaign against terrorism, the review of sponsored publications, and 
internet filtering” (Solomon, 2014. p.27). 
 
Additionally, the Saudi Arabian Government’s de-radicalisation programs generally views 
all relevant parties that are affected by terrorism as victims of terrorism, this includes 
casualties, families of casualties, communities as well as the radicalised terrorists who 
commit terrorist acts (Boucek, 2011). In treating the terrorist as a victim, Saudi Arabian de-
radicalisation programs can address and counteract motivating factors using techniques that 
are separate from any criminality or security sensitivities (Jones, 2015a). The Global 
Counter Terrorism Forum (2014) broadly addresses the need for a two way exchange 
between law enforcement and the community, including de-radicalised former extremists, 
as part of the community engagement and counter narrative approach. Choudhury (2009) 
clearly identifies the need for adequate and publically identifiable support services for 
terrorists who may question their association to these groups. Specifically, the service needs 
are identified as being based around intellectual support to assist terrorists in understanding 
questions regarding organisation ideology, as well as the need for emotional support 
mechanisms to address apprehensions around leaving an organisation, such as isolation or 
changing life purpose (Choudhury, 2009).  
 To address how an individual terrorist may actually be de-radicalised, the motivation 
for radical ideology must also be understood. While it is clear that any de-radicalisation 
program must be extensively tailored to address the motivating factors of a given terrorist, 
the Kruglanski and Gelfand (2015) succinctly summarise the radicalisation of a terrorist as 
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the belief is not necessarily religious, as the motivating factor may be political or social 
(DeAngelis, 2009). Within the context of potential strategies of de-radicalisation, 
Kruglanski and Gelfand (2015) accurately state that an ideology cannot be defeated only by 
force, in that one cannot beat terrorism out of a terrorist. In fact, the ineffectiveness of force 
driven reactions regarding de-radicalisation links back to de-radicalisation entailing a change 
in the terrorists commitment to extremist ideology, rather than simply stopping violent 
action as the terrorist may continue to idyllically support extreme ideals (Rabasa, Pettyjohn 
et al, 2010; Kruglanski and Gelfand, 2015).  
 One well known strategy for de-radicalising terrorists is de-radicalisation programs 
delivered in a residential camp or within an incarceration environment (Kruglanski and 
Gelfand, 2015; Bryans, 2014). Porges (2011) explains that de-radicalisation programs, in 
addition to religious or idyllic challenges, must enhance the education standard and 
vocational prospects of the subject terrorist in order for the program to be effective. Burke 
(2013) refers to de-radicalisation programs that are being administered by state military and 
police and identifies that these programs classically consisted of vocational training, 
provision of counselling and challenges to religious or ideological motivating factors. 
Despite the funding and promotion of the success of these de-radicalisation programs, Burke 
(2013) questions whether they actually assist terrorists to renounce extremist ideals. This, in 
part, is the question that this essay aims to answer. Stern and Porges (2010) clearly articulate 
the componentry of a successful de-radicalisation and recommend that these programs be 
extensively tailored to the subject terrorist, and include educational, vocational and religious 
content as well as community re-integration activities. Three consistent general aspects can 
be observed in examples of de-radicalisation programs. These consist of identifying religious 
inaccuracy, providing a means for the reforming terrorist to financially support themselves 
through vocation and community re-integration (Stern and Porges, 2010; Burke, 2013). 
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of challenging religious misrepresentation as a priority and in contrast promote that a 
behavioural change approach is more likely to succeed. This view of a behaviour-change 
approach aiming towards re-integration into normative community lives, rather than 
focusing on idyllic challenges is also supported by Bjorgo and Horgan, who state: 
 
“Initially, there should be at least as much emphasis on changing 
behaviour and the relationship with the militant group as on changing 
the ideological values of the extremist. A one-side focus on changing 
ideology alone (e.g. through theological debate) is unlikely to work 
unless it is also combined with influencing their behaviour and 
addressing their social ties to the group, family members, friends and 
others” (Bjorgo and Horgan, n.d. p.1). 
 
What should also be identified is the importance of appropriate one to one interaction 
between reforming terrorist and intervention personnel, which is said by Stern and Porges 
(2010) to be the single most critical aspect of any de-radicalisation program. This one to one 
interaction maintained over the duration of the program and potentially beyond becomes 
mentorship, which is logically a key aspect in preventing recidivism in de-radicalised former 
terrorists, as mentors will be able to provide advice, guidance and be an example for the 
terrorist within the program to follow (Spalek and Davies, 2012; Akbarzadeh, 2014). The 
importance of suitable mentoring within any de-radicalisation program should not be 
understated with this component’s importance being suitably summarised by Spalek and 
Davis, who state: 
 
“…it would appear that mentoring is a central aspect to the process of rehabilitation” 
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Returning to the specific composition of de-radicalisation programs, the Swat Valley 
in Pakistan provides a useful example. What can be observed is that there is significant 
gravitas placed into providing alternative income streams to reforming terrorists (Burke, 
2013). The value of providing alternative income streams, through practical vocation 
training and interest-free business establishment loans, is that it removes the financial 
dependence of the reforming terrorist from potentially returning to terrorist organisations 
for financial reasons. It should also be noted that in addition to vocational training employed 
in the Swat Valley, program administrators drew on the expertise of Islamic scholars to 
challenge the misrepresentation of Islamic doctrine that is promoted by terrorist 
organisation propaganda (Burke, 2013). This strategy demonstrates a consistent counter-
measure to the exploitative grooming and indoctrination that is employed by Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan. Tehrik-e-Taliban target financially vulnerable families and provide some 
gesture of financial sustainability through stipends and shelter provision, in exchange for the 
children being willing enrolled into Madrassas it administers (Obaid-Chinoy, 2009). 
 In reviewing a number of alternate de-radicalisation programs, it is apparent that the 
majority of programs are targeted towards captured radicals, rather than proactive efforts 
that target initiatives at currently ‘in-organisation’ terrorists. One notable exception is the 
proactive al Hitar de-radicalisation program of Yemen, which is described by numerous 
commentators as achieving limited success, primarily due to being inadequately funded and 
not properly conceptualised, despite possessing some proactive program focuses (Burke, 
2013; Hearne and Laiq, 2010; Johnsen and Boucek, 2008). The intention of this point is not 
to highlight any deficiency within the Yemeni initiative, rather this is intended to highlight 
that the priority of de-radicalisation programs is targeted at terrorists who are captured and 
due to physical constraints, have already been disengaged from the terrorist organisation 
(Burke, 2013; Hearne and Laiq, 2010; Johnsen and Boucek, 2008). Also, importantly the 
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ongoing refutation of terrorism in both ideology and violent practice (Hearne and Laiq, 
2010).  
 There are a number of de-radicalisation program examples in Europe, specifically 
Exit Germany, Exit Sweden and Exit Norway, which target de-radicalisation of extreme 
right-winged groups, such as Neo-Nazi’s (Bjorgo and Horgan, n.d; Köhler and Berczyk, 
2014). The stated aims of these de-radicalisation organisations are consistently aimed at 
providing advice and guidance to assist willing ‘in-organisation’ extremists to find an avenue 
out of the organisation, with the organisations targeted being right-winged Neo-Nazi or 
racially motivated extremist groups (Köhler and Berczyk, 2014; Ramalingam, 2014: Butt 
and Tuck, n.d). The discrepancy in the examples of Germany, Norway and Sweden is that 
the motivating factor that drives the violent extremism is political or societal, which 
contrasts with Islamic extremist that is driven by belief in religious doctrine. As Stern and 
Porges (2010) have noted, it may be much more challenging to convince a radical that their 
religious beliefs are fundamentally incorrect. Akbarzadeh (2014) also comments on the 
reliance on engaging Islamic scholars to denounce violent action as being inconsistent with 
Islam. In his assessment, a de-radicalisation program that relies on rebutting terrorist action 
as being un-Islamic misses the mark as it does not acknowledge the variance in 
circumstances that may contribute to a person being radicalised initially (Akbarzadeh, 
2014). In making these assertions, Akbarzadeh (2014) infers that a de-radicalisation 
program must be uniquely tailored to address the contributory radicalisation factors of each 
individual terrorist.  
 Looking specifically at potentially de-radicalising terrorists, including perhaps those 
who have travelled to Iraq and Syria in order to fight with Islamic State, Jones (2015a) 
believes that the approach of almost banishing these radicals from returning (to Australia) is 
counter-intuitive to the de-radicalisation of these individuals. Jones (2015a) raises the issue 
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encouragement to return of their own accord to participate in de-radicalisation programs. 
Further, Jones (2015a) notes that radicalisation and de-radicalisation must be addressed as a 
social problem in policy, rather than a criminal or state security manner as well as their 
needing to be separation between de-radicalisation interventions and intelligence gathering 
programs. As Jones (2015a) also states, the national security sector and criminal intelligence 
community are most likely not the most suitable entities to manage de-radicalisation 
interventions, and that these interventions are more appropriately delivered through civil 
society actors. It may also be accurate to say that in deciding to return from embedment with 
a terrorist organisation of one’s own accord constitutes the commencement of the de-
radicalisation process for that individual.  
 Allowing terrorists to return to a home country does create a practical issue of how 
terrorists will be managed, whether this be in correctional facilities or living amongst 
communities (Jones, 2015b). Jones (2014) identifies the prisoner management technique of 
isolation and limiting contact as being a tactic that is employed to manage the custody of 
terrorists from a desire to prevent common population prisoners from becoming radicalised 
by the terrorist. However, this practice goes no way towards de-radicalising that given 
terrorist. In fact this isolation technique can lead to a continued commitment to violent 
extremism (Jones, 2014; Bryans, 2014). In the case of terrorism prisoners who are not 
subject to life sentences, the terrorist may be released at some time and it will be to the 
wider communities benefit that if at the time of release, the terrorist had progressed towards 
de-radicalisation (Jones, 2014; Bryans, 2014). In explanation of this issue, Jones states: 
 
“For terrorist offenders, incarceration can reduce their chances of 
rehabilitation. It may increase disruptive behaviour, as well as enhance 
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exclusivity and ‘martyrdom’, and may even foster or magnify the causes 
that led offenders to terrorism in the first place” (Jones, 2014. p.2).  
 
Applying the statements of Jones (2014) to the conundrum of how might a terrorist 
who is incarcerated be de-radicalised, the answer is not through isolation. Isolation may be 
detrimental to psychiatric health of the terrorist, which will be negative to the possibility of 
de-radicalisation (Jones, 2014). Further, isolation from the common prison community is 
likely to allow for continuation of commitment to extremism (Jones, 2014; Bryans, 2014). 
Jones (2014) notes that potentially the prisoner management technique that is most likely to 
support terrorist prisoner de-radicalisation is dispersing terrorist prisoners amongst the 
common prisoner population.  
 A further de-radicalisation realm that must be considered is the use of social media 
by terrorist organisations to recruit (Mohamedou, 2015). As Mohamedou (2015) notes, 
Islamic State is far exceeding all other organisation in digital capability. One result of the 
digital capabilities of groups like Islamic State is the radicalisation of individuals to such an 
extent that they either leave families and communities to join these groups, or remain 
embedded within communities where they pose a risk of lone wolf terrorism attacks 
(Edwards, Gribbon, Reding, and Von Behr, 2013; Marret, 2013). Conversely, it is then 
reasonable to consider there to be potential to utilise digital and social media to disseminate 
information and resources that are aimed at encouraging disengagement and questioning of 
a terrorist’s commitment to the terrorist organisation. Ashour (2010) views the use of the 
internet as a vital tool in disseminating counter-messages and narratives in order to promote 
de-radicalisation amongst radicalised terrorists. Given the expansive body of terrorist group 
material that is propagates through social media and the internet, it seems reasonable that 
the internet is also the platform for publicising effective counter-narrative messages with the 
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Neumann, 2009; Schmid, 2013; Ashour, 2010). This is due to two reasons, firstly as 
Stevens and Neumann (2009) note, through the vast expanse of digital terrorism 
propaganda, technical interventions such as taking down webpages or denial of service 
attacks are ineffective as the targets are too many. While commenting on the ability of state 
actors to be effective in removing terrorist content from the internet, Schmid states: 
 
“Any strategy that hopes to counter online radicalisation must aim to 
create an environment in which the production and consumption of 
such materials become not just more difficult in a technical sense but 
unacceptable as well as less desirable” (Schmid, 2013. p.35). 
 
In de-radicalising any terrorist through digital interventions, the evidence supports 
that strategies aimed at removing or hiding terrorism digital content will not succeed 
(Schmid, 2013). Instead, what is needed is a robust counter-narrative that takes advantage of 
social media dissemination capabilities, by discrediting and removing the relevance of a 
given terrorism motivation factor, this approach will create the highest likelihood of de-
radicalising any terrorist (Nawaz, 2011; Stevens and Neumann, 2009; Schmid, 2013).  
Secondly, what has been seen through the example of Islamic State is that a reaching 
out to vulnerable people is effective as it reaches vulnerable persons who are searching for 
purpose through a digital platform (Pantucci, 2011). Accordingly,  a comparatively 
extensive counter-radicalisation social media campaign that is conducted over as many 
levels as groups like Islamic State utilise, may be effective in de-radicalisation of ‘in 
organisation’ terrorists (Labi, 2006; Stevens and Neumann, 2009; Pantucci, 2011). Within 
the digital realm, there is also potential for self-de-radicalisation, given the nature of how 
self-radicalised and lone-wolf terrorists can become radicalised through exposure to digital 
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2014). To explain, just as a lone-wolf terrorist is likely to have, to a varying degree, become 
radicalised through clandestine exposure to terrorism propaganda, there is also potential 
that a radicalised terrorist can become self-de-radicalised through exposure to broad 
counter-radicalisation narratives and also person-to-person de-radicalisation interaction 
within a digital space (Pantucci, 2011; Marret, 2013; Dow Jones and Company, 2014). The 
advantage of digital self-de-radicalisation is exactly the same as the advantageous secrecy of 
digital radicalisation, as it is also available in isolation, can be easily accessed and provides a 
measure of anonymity and secrecy to the person accessing it (Edwards, Gribbon, et al, 
2013). This ability to conceal ones identity and obtain information in a discrete manner, 
provides a point where information of a counter-terrorist message can be located by the 
given terrorist, who might be questioning their commitment to violent extremism with a 
minimised risk of being discovered. In harnessing the potential for online self-de-
radicalisation or self-disengagement, what is of paramount importance is the content of the 
counter-narrative, it must carry the same message and information of any non-digital 
counter-radicalisation strategy.  
 Self-de-radicalisation is not limited to clandestine secret enquiring over the internet 
by terrorists who are currently within an organisation. This self-de-radicalisation can occur 
through a gradual process of realisation of the inconsistencies contained within the doctrine 
of extremist organisations (Husain, 2007a). While not being a terrorist involved in violent 
extremism, a prominent example of this gradual realisation process and eventual exit from a 
terrorist organisation is that of Mohamed ‘Ed’ Mahbub Husain, who is explained to have 
been indoctrinated into two extremist Islamic organisations, namely Jamat-e-Islami and 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (Kuhl, 2009). Husain was a Muslim child who was raised in the United 
Kingdom and reported many feelings in life that are common among radicals; of isolation, 
discrimination, not fitting in and experiencing jarring between normative life in the United 
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world (Kuhl, 2009; Sageman, 2008; Husain, 2007a). What Husain demonstrated is the 
ability of an individual to self-de-radicalise through a gradual process that involved efforts 
by close family members identifying the truth of Islam in contrast to the propaganda of 
terrorist organisations over the long term, as well a crisis point at which time active efforts to 
extricate himself from the organisation were undertaken (Kuhl, 2009; Husain, 2007a: 
Husain, 2007b). This crisis point for Husain is identified as the murder of a non-Muslim 
student on Husain’s university campus grounds by a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir. This 
incident started a process of comparative consideration and questioning of the idyllic 
motivation of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which led to Husain’s eventual de-radicalisation and exit from 
the organisation (Kuhl, 2009; Husain, 2007a: Husain, 2007b). While the example of 
Husain demonstrates that a person can de-radicalise themselves and disengage from a 
terrorist organisation, this example also highlights an opportunity that de-radicalisation 
programs need to exploit, this opportunity is that of the effectiveness of the counter-
narrative (Husain, 2007; Schmid, 2013). As Husain (2007a: Husain, 2007b) explains his 
father provided a sustained and rational counter-narrative that identified the conflict 
between Islam and the distortion of Islam that was propagated by the terrorist organisation. 
While the point at which Husain actively commenced disengagement from the organisation 
was the murder of a non-Muslim student, the relevance of the counter-narrative that was 
provided by his father should not be downplayed, as it continually identified the 
inconsistency of radical Islam (Husain, 2007a; Husain, 2007b).  This demonstrates the 
relevance of sustained, accurate and effectively disseminated counter-narratives that can be 
applied at all levels of society (Husain, 2007a; Husain, 2007b). What is clear from the 
Husain example is that counter-narratives work and it would be advantageous in exposing 
‘in organisation’ terrorists to teaching that contradicts with the doctrine of terrorist 
organisations (Nawaz, 2011; Husain; 2007a; Husain, 2007b: Atran, Bunting, Husain, 
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obvious that Husain would have experienced significant difficultly in disengage himself 
from the organisation, it is perhaps much harder for a de-radicalising terrorist to disengage 
from and while in the territory of a group such as Islamic State (Barrett, 2014; Spencer, 
2015; Husain, 2007a: Husain, 2007b; Kulh, 2009). This links back to the suggestion of 
Jones that on assessment of individual cases, terrorists should be encouraged to return to the 
home country so that de-radicalisation activities can be undertaken (Jones, 2015a). While 
this will not alleviate the danger of leaving an organisation like Islamic State, at least 
providing the possibility of returning home and restarting a productive life will remove one 
obstacle in the road of a terrorist taking steps to de-radicalise (Jones, 2015a; Barrett, 2014; 
Spencer, 2015).   
 The answer to this question of how could a terrorist be de-radicalised is multi-
faceted. There is no one set formula that will turn a terrorist into a functioning member of a 
community, further to achieve de-radicalisation, a de-radicalisation program must be 
inimitably structured to every individual case (Stern and Porges, 2010). Additionally, the 
success of de-radicalisation is not easily quantified (Horgan and Altier, 2012). De-
radicalisation can also be a result of reactive de-radicalisation programs, through proactive 
counter-radicalisation programs, or through the self-de-radicalisation of an individual who 
becomes unable to reconcile the ideology of an organisation and disengages themselves 
(Husain, 2007a, Husain, 2007b; Boucek, 2011, Townsend, 2011). Aspects for the 
successful de-radicalisation of a terrorist should be taken from both counter-radicalisation 
and de-radicalisation techniques, as each of these broad strategies have the potential to act 
on the commitment of the given terrorist and contribute to their eventual de-radicalisation 
(Stern and Porges, 2010; Townsend, 2011). De-radicalising an indoctrinated terrorist is not 
an easy process, and methods should be adaptable, whilst opportunities for a person to self-
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